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WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW
general records compiled for use in the ordinary course of business of a
transit company, though placed in the hands of an attorney, did not come
within ,the attorney-client privilege and had to be produced for purposes of
deposition.' The court in the principal case, in following the reasoning of
these decisions, held that since the defendant asked for the names and
addresses of persons known to the plaintiff at the time of the accident, this
information was not privileged.' 0
The Hyde and Keough cases serve as an indirect limitation on the
Schoepf case since they permit records which contain the names of possible
witnesses to be subpoenaed. The prinicipal case seems to be a logical ex-
tension of the Hyde and Keough cases.
RONALD PENNER
CHARITABLE LOTTERIES - INJUNCTION -
OHIO CONSTITUTION
In a taxpayer's suit to enjoin the expenditure of tax funds in issuing
lottery licenses it was held that a Cleveland municipal ordinance' author-
izing the city to license lotteries conducted for charitable purposes is un-
constitutional because in conflict with the Ohio Constitution, Article 15,
Section 6.2
The Ohio Constitution since its adoption in 1851 has provided that
"'lotteries and the sale of lottery tickets, for any purpose whatever, shall
forever be prohibited in this state."8  Prior to 1943, Ohio General Code
Sections 13063 and 13064 subjected to punishment anyone who promoted
a lottery or sold or disposed of a lottery ticket. In that year these sections
were amended by the addition of the words "for his own profit."4  This
addition seems to condone the operation of a lottery for charitable purposes 5
Under the home rule provision of the Ohio Constitution," it seems that
municipal imposition of penalties for the operation of charitable lotteries,
despite the absence of punitive state legislation, is constiutuonal.7 How-
ever, as decided in the principal case, a municipal ordinance purporting to
authorize a charitable lottery is unconstitutional."
The question arises whether there can be enforcement of the constitu-
'However, any records or reports which are made or come into existence as a result
of an accident are privileged in the hands of an adverse party and the other side
can not compel their production. In re Shoup, 154 Ohio St. 221, 94 NE.2d 625
(1950); It re Keough, 151 Ohio St. 307, 85 N.E.2d 550 (1949); In re Hyde, 149
Ohio St. 407, 79 N.E.2d 224 (1948). See also OHio GENERAL CODE § 11551 in
regard to the obtaining of books and writings in the possession of the opposing party.
" While the court does not expressly state that the plaintiff's knowledge of the
names in question is analogous to corporate records kept for general purposes, the
implication is unavoidable.
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tional prohibition of lotteries in the continued absence of state or mumcipal
pumntive legislation.
Generally, prohibitive and restrictive provisions sinilar to the prohibi-
ton of lotteries found in the Ohio Constitution are self-executing9 and
have been enforced by courts independent of legislative action.'0
The court in the principal case states that Artlde 15, Section 6 of the
Ohio Constitution is self-execuung to the extent that it discloses the public
policy of the state, and anything done in violation thereof is void."
When the general welfare demands it, courts of equity have granted
'CLEvwLAND MUN. CODE § 2925-11 to 2925-22 ("bingo" ordinance).
"Kraus v. City of Cleveland, 89 Ohio App. 504, 96 N.E.2d 314 (1950), appeal
dismissed, 155 Ohio St. 98, 97 N.E.2d 549 (1952).
'OH-o CoNsr. Art. 15 § 6. As to what constitutes a lottery see 25 OHlo JUR. 811
(1932) and cases cited therein.
4 120 Ohio Laws 663. Omo GEimL x CODE § 13064, as amended, has been held
constitutional and not in conflict with OHIO CONST., Art. 15 § 6, but, so far as it
goes, in complete harmony with that provision. State v. Parker, 150 Ohio St 22,
80 N.E.2d 490 (1948), overruling Disabled American Veterans v. O'Neill, 43 Ohio
L. Abs. 479 (1945).
'Jamestown Lions Club v. Smith, 45 Ohio Op. 157 (1951).
6 Olo CoNsT. Art. 19, § 3.
"Disabled American Veterans v. O'Neill, 43 Ohio L. Abs. 479 (1949) Cf. State
v. Schwable, 53 Ohio L Abs. 264, 272, 84 N.E.2d 768, 773 (1948).
'Accord, Gimbel v. Peabody, 114 N.J.L. 574, 178 Ad. 62 (1935); Seattle v. Chin
Let, 19 Wash. 38, 52 Pac. 324 (1898).
'A constitutional provision is said to be self-executing where no legislation is nec-
essary to give it effect. State ex rel Russell v. Bliss, 156 Ohio St. 147, 101 N.E.2d
289 (1951); Datesh v. State, 23 Ohio N.P. (N.S.) 273, 279 et seq. (1920); Sheets
Mfg. Co. v. Neer Mfg. Co., 4 Ohio N.P. (N.S.) 201, 212 (1906); 11 AM. JtnR. 688,
Constitutionai Law § 71 (1937). Although the absence of a penalty is a factor
indicating that a provision is not self-executing, it is not conclusive. Shipp v. Rodes,
196 Ky. 523, 245 S.W 157 (1922).
" In the usual case enforcement by the courts is in an indirect or negative manner
where the parties are before the court on some collateral matter. Succession of
Gabisso, 119 Ia. 704, 44 So. 438 (1907) (prohibition of miscegenation held to
preclude one from inheriting as a spouse); Datesh v. State, 23 Ohio N.P. (N.S.)
273 (1920) (violation of a constitutional prohibition of the sale of intoxicating
liquor held to be an "unlawful act"). However, there are cases of direct affirmative
enforcement. Mutual Orange Distributor v. Agricultural Prorate Commission of
California, 35 F. Supp. 108 (1940) (commerce clause of the federal Constitution
held self-executing); State ex rel Kellogg v. Kansas Mercantile Ass'n, 45 Kan. 351,
25 Pat. 984 (1891) (corporation deprived of charter in quo warranto proceeding
for violation of constitutional prohibition of lotteries); Shipp v. Rodes, 196 Ky.
523, 245 S.W 157 (1922) (constitutional prohibition of the receipt of more than
a stipulated sum as compensation for official services of public officers enforced
against a sheriff).
'Kraus v. City of Cleveland, 89 Ohio App. 504, 511, 96 NE.2d 314, 317 (1950).
The Ohio Supreme Court has said that Ohio Const Art. 15, § 6 is not self-executing
in the sense of providing a penalty for a violation thereof. See State v. Parker, 150
Ohio St. 22, 25, 80 N.E.2d 490, 492, (1948).
1952]
